Volume 33
Issue 3 Summer 1993
Summer 1993

Institutional Feasibility of Contingent Waste Marketing to Increase
Migratory Flows for Salmon on the Upper Snake River
Ray Huffaker
Norman K. Whittlesey
Phillip R. Wndschneider

Recommended Citation
Ray Huffaker, Norman K. Whittlesey & Phillip R. Wndschneider, Institutional Feasibility of Contingent
Waste Marketing to Increase Migratory Flows for Salmon on the Upper Snake River, 33 Nat. Resources J.
671 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol33/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

RAY HUFFAKER, NORMAN K. WHITTLESEY,
PHILLIP R. WANDSCHNEIDER

Institutional Feasibility Of
Contingent Water Marketing To
Increase Migratory Flows For
Salmon On The Upper Snake
River*
INTRODUCTION
This paper identifies and attempts to resolve the potential institutional and legal obstacles to superimposing a dry-year option (contingent)
water market between irrigators and hydropower utilities on the prior
appropriation water rights system governing the upper Snake River region
of Idaho. The purpose of such a market is to increase migratory flows for
declining anadromous salmon stocks.' The obstacles are created by the
considerable difficulties, under Idaho law, in transferring water from
agricultural to nonagricultural uses, and in exporting water to out-of-state
users.
The timing for this study cannot be more propitious. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) recently listed three Pacific North-'
west' salmon stocks as endangered or threatened species3 under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 4 The NMFS now must formulate a
recovery plan for these fish populations. Moreover, the recently listed
stocks are facing the worst projected water conditions in 50 years.Department of Agricultural Economics, Washington State University, Pullman, WA
1. "Columbia Basin sockeye once had run sizes of up to three million fish, but of eight
lake-riverine systems that supported the bulk of the runs, only three remain: the Okanagon
and Wenatchee River systems in Washington and the Salmon in Idaho. Unfortunately,
Idaho-bound sockeye are now virtually extinct: yearly counts at Ice Harbor Dam have
dropped from 1,276 in 1964 to 4 in 1989, and sockeye spawners in Redfish Lake during 1981
to 1984 were 26, 50, 0 and 22, respectively." Natural Resources Law Institute, Anadromous
Fish Law, 50 Anadromous Fish Law Memo 4 (1990).
2. The Pacific Northwest region of the United States contains Washington, Oregon, Idaho,
and the western section of Montana.
3. The NMFS listed the Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered in November 1991
(56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §222)). The NMFS listed the Snake
River spring/summer Chinook salmon and the Snake River fail Chinook salmon as
threatened in April 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §227)).
4. Pub. L No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973)(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§1531-1543 (1982)).
5. J. Titone, Meager Snouppacks Melt Early: More Trouble For Region's Salmon, Spokane
*
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Weather experts are certain that the short-term El Nifio phenomenon 6 is
partly to blame, but they are uncertain about the duration of the
longer-term dry cycle in which the region is currently immnersed.
Contingent water markets operate via an 'option contract' that
gives the buyer temporary use of the water whenever a given contingency occurs (e.g., drought) over the contract period. The seller (e.g., a
farmer) retains ownership of the water right and receives his or her
normal water supply during years when the option is not exercised. Both
parties benefit, since the buyer obtains a secure water supply during the
contingency, and the seller is paid for the option and maintains secure
long-term water supplies that allow for continued operation and
long-term financing.
Contingent water markets have not yet developed to a significant
degree.' One researcher reports that a Utah city purchased a long-term
option to lease water from an irrigator for $25,000, plus an additional
$1,000 and 300 tons of hay in any year the option was exercised. The city
exercised the option during a total of three dry seasons in the first 25
years of the agreement.9 Other researchers report two recent abortive
attempts to establish dry-year options in California. These options were
rejected by farmers due to low purchase offers that apparently did not
compensate for the increased uncertainty in farm planning. °
The conventional transaction for securing water supplies during
dry-year shortages, or for future use, has been the conditional lease-back.
Municipalities and other major water purveyors purchase water rights
from irrigators either by purchasing blocks of irrigation district shares"
or by making standing offers to purchase water rights. 2 The water is

Spokesman-Review, Apr. 18, 1992, at Al.
6. El Nifto (Christ Child) is an increase in water temperature that occurs along the coasts
of Ecuador and Peru every two to seven years during the Christmas season. A strong El
Nifto can precipitate massive weather changes over at least two-thirds of the globe,
especially in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. See, e.g., G. Miller, Living in the Environment: An Introduction to Environmental Science (6th ed. 1990).
7. Titone, supra note 5, at AS.
8. See A. Michelsen, Economics of Optioning Agricultural Water Rights for Urban Water
Supplies During Drought 31 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado State
University); S. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 Nat. Res. J.413,
419 (1989).
9. Shupe et al., supra note 8, at 419.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Water Intelligence Monthly, Feb. 1991, at 6 The North Weld Water District
purchased 200 CBT (Colorado-Big Thompson) units in February 1991 for drought insurance
to be leased out in nondrought years. Id.
12. Water Strategist Monthly, Nov. 1990, at 126. Albuquerque purchased water in
November 1990 from irrigators in Sandoval and Socorro Counties for future municipal use.
The water was to be leased back to farmers at no charge for 10 years. Farmers desiring to
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leased back to agriculture during nondrought periods, or until the future
need arises.
Problem Development
Anadromous13 salmon populations in the Pacific Northwest
instinctively migrate downstream as juveniles (smolts) from tributaries of
the Columbia and Snake Rivers to the Pacific Ocean. Historically, smolts
were swept along their migratory routes in about a week via the spring
freshet."' However, the natural flow regimes of the mainstem Columbia
and Snake Rivers have been altered drastically by water development for
flood control, water storage, hydropower production, navigation, and
5 Smolts that are not collected at various dams
irrigation (see Figure la).1
and barged downriver must journey for as many as 45 days through a
series of slack-water pools and hydroelectric turbines (see Figure lb). 6
This exposes them to a multitude of dangers (e.g., disorientation,
increased exposure to predators, disease, injury, et cetera). Only a small
percentage of non-barged smolts (five percent in some cases) successfully
reach the Columbia River estuary. 7
Severe population declines prompted the NMFS to list the Snake
River Sockeye salmon as endangered under the ESA in the fall of 1991,'8
and the spring-summer and fall Snake River Chinook salmon as
threatened in the spring of 1992."9 Listing of these salmon stocks
requires the NMFS to develop and implement a recovery plan elevating
fish production to the highest priority use in the Columbia River
System.' A successful plan must formulate strategies to foster smolt
migration in a river system that has been described as "unsuitable for fish
passage"21 by one commentator. This unsuitability derives from reduced
freshet and slower water flows through the reservoirs.'
extend leases beyond 10 years (2000) will have to pay market prices for the water.

13. Anadromous fish instinctively ascend rivers from the sea to breed at their places of
birth.
14. A freshet is an overflowing of a stream that is swollen by heavy rain or melted snow.
15. Reproduced with permission from P. Wandschneider, Agriculture Research Center
(Washington State University), Pub. No. XB 0937, Control and Management of the

Columbia-Snake River System (1984).
16. Reproduced with permission from US. Army Corps of Engineers, Juvenile Fish
Bypass Goals (1988).

17. J.Hamilton & N. Whittlesey, Contingent Water Markets for Salmon Recovery (1992)
(unpublished working paper, University of Idaho, Dep't of Agricultural Economics and
Washington State University, Dep't of Agricultural Economics).
18. See supra note 3.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §1531 (b)(1988).
See Natural Resources Law Institute, supra note 1, at 32.
Id. at 14.
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Salmon stocks have continued to decline under existing river
management strategies developed in accordance with the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980,1 as
directed by the Northwest Power Planning Council.24 The Power
Council is responsible for preparing a Regional Energy and Conservation
Plan that incorporates a Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program' (CBFWP). The Bonneville Power Administrative (BPA), which
markets the power generated at the Columbia River's federal dams, must
conform to the plan "to the fullest extent practicable."' A major
component of the CBFWP is the creation of a 'water budget' that sets
aside a block of water to increase migratory flows.' The BPA must plan
for this block of water as though it were needed to fulfill a power
contract.t
Recommended water I6udgets have called for stream flows of
85,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) (Power Council) to 140,000 cfs
(Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority) in the lower Snake River
throughout the migration period.' These flows are intended to drive as
many smolts as possible toward collection points at Lower Granite and
Little Goose Dams for barge transport to the estuary (see Figure 1b). One
possible reason that this 'flush-barge' strategy has not assured the
survival of endangered upper-Snake salmon runs is that the full water
budget never has been made available for the entire migration period,
and only a small fraction of the budget has been made available in some
years. 0 Therefore, a major issue in developing the NMFS recovery plan
is to identify water sources to fund an enhanced water budget. Analysts
have focused their attention on upper Snake River (Idaho) water sources
since flushing smolts through the lower Snake River (either to a
lower-Snake collection facility or to the Columbia River where more
water is available for fish passage) may be a necessary step for recovering
the upper Snake River Sockeye run.'

23. 16 U.S.C. §§839-839h (1988) [hereinafter Northwest Power Act].
24. The Power Council is composed of eight members, two each appointed by the
governors of Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and Washington. The Council is the product of an
interstate compact authorized by the Northwest Power Act (16 U.S.C. §839b (1988))
[hereinafter "Power Council"]. See also Wandschneider, supra note 15, at 13.
25. 16 U.S.C. §839b(h)(1)(A).
26. 16 U.S.C. §839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).
27. See Wandschneider, supra note 15, at 40.
28. Id. at 40.
29. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Water Supplies To Promote Juvenile Anadromous
Fish Migration In The Snake River Basin: A Report to the National Marine Fisheries Service
i-I (1991) [hereinafter NMFS Report].
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A recent report to the NMFS investigated several means of
freeing up water for smolt migration, 2 including: (1) changes in
hydropower and flood control operations so that they are more consistent
with fish passage;' (2) purchase of contracted storage rights in upper
Snake River reservoirs, both inside and outside of the framework of the
Idaho Water Bank;' (3) instream flow rights,' and (4) permanent
transfer of natural flow rights from upper Snake River irrigators.' The
report concludes that changes in hydropower and flood control
operations offer the best opportunity to supply water for smolt passage,
"because the major projects operated for these purposes are located
relatively close to Lower Granite Dam."37 This conclusion appears to be
predicated on the assumption that agricultural water rights for irrigation
are sacred and unalterable. Certainly, Idaho water statutes and

32. Id.
33. Id. at i-12. Hydropower production competes with fish production because
hydropower production shapes streamflows to meet seasonal power demands that are out
of phase with the seasonal requirements for downstream migration for fish production. The
NMFS report concludes that "Reduction of winter power generation from Brownlee and
Dworshak reservoirs through implementation of energy exchanges could yield up to 800,000
ld. at 14. Flood control
I..."
[acre feet] of [the 1.19 million acre feet water budget target] .
operations evacuate water from reservoirs in the winter to free up reservoir space to capture
the spring runoff that historically propelled smolts downstream. The NMFS report suggests
analyzing flood control rule curves at Brownlee and Dworshak reservoirs to see if winter
evacuation can be reduced so that more storage water is available as the water budget
period begins. Id. at i-12 to i-13.
34. Id. at i-8. Stored water in federal reservoirs is allocated via "spaceholder contracts"
which entitle the contractee to water associated with a specified amount of storage space.
The contractee's quantity of water in a given year is equal to the contractee's carryover
storage from the previous year, plus a specified portion of the current year's inflow. About
seven percent of contracted storage water is held in the Idaho Water Bank program, a state
program designed to facilitate the leasing of this water. Although the Water Bank program
allows storage rights to be leased through an established market mechanism, there
traditionally have been many requirements. Primary among these have been the statutory
prohibition against leasing water generating out-of-state benefits, See Idaho Code §42-1763,
and the penalties imposed by local water bank rules for leasing water to instream uses (e.g.,
lessor has last refill priority the next year). NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 5-10. The Water
Bank statutes were recently amended to overcome some of these disadvantages. (See the
section infra entitled "Injuries to Other Water Rights.")
35. NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 3-12. The Idaho Department of Water Resources
(IDWR) is authorized by statute to establish water rights for minimum streamflows. See
Idaho Code §42-1501. The major drawback to relying on instream flow rights to supply
water for fish is that the IDWR can acquire water for instream flow rights only from
unappropriated water. Thus, the rights acquired are very junior and can be "called out"
during droughts by the multitude of senior irrigation rights during droughts. (See section
infra entitled "The Prior Appropriation Doctrine.")
36. NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 3-8 to 3-9.
37. Id. at i-14.
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regulations pose substantial legal difficulties for those who want to
transfer water from agricultural to nonagricultural uses by purchasing
either natural flow rights from irrigators or contracted storage rights
through the Idaho Water Bank.3
Changes in hydropower and flood control operations may furnish
adequate flow levels in the lower Snake River in years of average or
above-average rainfall. However, there may be insufficient flows for fish
in drought periods unless pressure can be exerted on other components
of the Snake River system to contribute to a water budget." Droughts
can be especially hard on ESA-listed salmon stocks, where survival of
each year's run is essential for recovery, because agricultural water rights
are generally senior to instream flow rights-agriculture receives its usual
supply first, regardless of the quantity remaining for fish passage.
Consequently, eventual recovery may require an increase in the flexibility
of using upper Snake River irrigation water to fund a water budget
during droughts.
Increasing the flexibility of the water transfer system also may be
in Idaho's interest. One commentator, for example, argues that the ESA
grants the federal government "regulatory property rights"' that allow
it to modify the exercise of state-granted water rights. According to this
view, state water rules can be displaced by federal regulation when state
concerns in protecting local property interests conflict with federal
environmental protection objectives."1 Thus, to maintain its traditional
allocation sovereignty, Idaho may need to develop new allocation
mechanisms that provide for increased migratory flows when they are
needed to promote federal goals in recovering endangered and
threatened salmon stocks.' These new allocation mechanisms should be

38. Id. at i-7 to i-9. The NMFS Report did not consider the controversial "Idaho plan,"
proposed by Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus, that would draw down lower Snake River
reservoirs during migratory periods. Drawdowns would narrow the river channel, and thus
would require a smaller release of Idaho water to flush fish toward the ocean. Proponents
(e.g., Idaho irrigators) argue that the drawdown plan is more cost effective than the current
plan which requires higher flows and barging of juvenile fish around dams. Opponents (e.g.,
lower-Snake River port authorities) argue that the proponents' cost figures are too low, and
that a more complete accounting would prove the flush-barge strategy to be the most cost
effective.
39. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 2. The concern over the flexibility of the
Columbia River system to preserve salmon stocks during droughts is not new. See, e.g.,
Columbia River Water Management Group, Committee on Fishery Operations, Special
Drought Year Operation for Downstream Fish Migrants (1977).
40. D. Tarlock, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Western Water Rights, 20 Land & Water L.
Rev. 1, 3 (1985).
41. Id. at 17.
42. The Idaho legislature recently demonstrated such flexibility in making interim
modifications to Idaho Water Bank statutes that liberalize previous impediments against
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formulated quickly because the federal NMFS and representatives from
other states on the Power Council are already voicing concerns about
institutional obstacles to increasing Idaho's water flow. 3
One possible innovation is creation of an option lease (contingent)
water market with irrigated agriculture in Idaho. The NMFS report
mentioned, but did not investigate, this possibility for supplying higher
flows for fish passage during droughts."4 Contingent water transfers
differ from permanent transfers in that agriculture retains ownership of
water rights, but leases out water to increase stream flows during dry
periods.' The retention of water rights in agriculture and the delivery
of a full supply during normal rainfall years would: (1) promote Idaho's
interest in protecting the long-term stability of agriculture, and (2) relieve
the pressure exerted on other components of the river system to fund a
water budget in below-average water supply conditions.
Recent economic research demonstrates that a contingent water
market for fish passage in the Columbia River system could be financed
by secondary hydropower benefits, thereby making it self-sustaining.*
However, the researchers agree with the NMFS report that the actual
implementation of contingent water markets with agriculture in Idaho
must be founded on a careful investigation of potential institutional
obstacles.47 The sections that follow present such an investigation. The
discussion focuses on the economic feasibility and basic operation of a
contingent water market in Idaho. Idaho water law and policy are
presented and evaluated on whether they are sufficiently flexible to
support intermittent water transfers coordinated by a contingent water
market.
I.

CONTINGENT WATER MARKETING

Contingent water marketing operates in conjunction with a prior
appropriation rights allocation system. This section begins, therefore, with
a brief background discussion of the prior appropriation doctrine.

renting stored water for salmon migration. See Act approved March 30, 1992, ch. 101, 1992
Idaho Sess. Laws (codified as amended at Idaho Code §42-1763A (1992)). The Act sets out
an interim policy effective until January 1, 1995.
43. Idaho Accused Of Damming Up Salmon Effort, Spokane Spokesman-Review, May 12,
1992, at Al.
44. NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 5-2.
45. This paper considers only the possibility of using markets for flow rights, not for
groundwater. The linkage between aquifer and streamflow is not sufficiently immediate, and
the third party effects are too strong, to allow the water rights associated with wells to be
moved to different locations by a market. See Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 5.
46. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at (i).
47. Id. at 34; NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 5-2.
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A. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The prior appropriation doctrine is the foundation of western
United States water law.' It allocates water during shortages (i.e., when
total demands on stream flow exceed total supply at a particular point in
time) on a 'first in time, first in right' priority basis so that 'senior'
appropriators receive their full entitlements until no water remains. More
'junior' appropriators may receive no water during shortages.
In general, a person gains a usufructuary (i.e., user's) right to
water that is 'diverted' to a 'beneficial use,' and the priority of the right
reaches back to the date of first diversion and use. Water that is not
beneficially used is 'abandoned' and subject to appropriation by another
person. The parameters delimiting an appropriative right are the priority
date, diversionary entitlement, point of diversion, and place and purpose
of use.4 9
Junior appropriators are protected against 'enlargement of use'
by senior appropriators. The concept of 'return flows' underlies this
protection. Consumptive use of water is normally less than the full
diversionary quantity. The unconsumed water can return to the stream
by surface return flow, or by subterranean return flow after deep
percolation to an underlying aquifer. Either way, return flows eventually
increase the downstream supply of water and thus, along with natural
flows, supply part of someone else's water right' s The above delimiting
parameters of an appropriative right fail to account directly for return
flow impacts. This failure is attributed by commentators to the crude
understanding of stream hydrology in the last century,"1 and the
possible physicals and economic' infeasiblity of measuring return
flows, even with the more advanced understanding of today. The failure
has been identified as a major reason that water markets are not more
prevalent,.
Figure 2a, below, demonstrates operation of the prior
appropriation system by hypothetically allocating an initial stream flow
among three appropriators, each with a diversionary right of 1000 acre
feet (af) over the entire irrigation season. The order of priority is #2, #1,

48. See G. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 Land & Water L. Rev.
1, 8-12 (1988).
49. Id. at S.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 25.
53. R. Johnson et al., The Definition Of A Surface Water Right And Transferability,24 J.L. &
Econ. 273, 283 (1981).
54. See Gould, supranote 48, at 4.
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and #3. Irrigation efficiency is assumed to be 50 percent for each user.
Water unused by crops is assumed to be split equally between
percolation to the aquifer (assumed to be lost to the system until days or
months later) and return flow (assumed to return immediately to the
stream, where it becomes part of the water supplying the next diversion).
When the initial flow (IF) is at least 2,500 af over the course of the
irrigation season, each user can divert the full entitlement of 1000 af.
When IF is more than 1,750 af but less than 2,500 af, users #1 and #2
receive their full diversions, but user #3's diversion decreases toward 250
af as IF approaches the lower bound of 1,750 af. When IF is more than
1,000 af but less than 1,750 af, user #2 continues to receive the full
diversion, user #3 receives 250 af via user #1's return flow, and user #1's
diversions decrease toward zero as IF approaches the lower bound of
1,000 af. Finally, when IF is greater than zero but less than 1,000 af, user
#1 receives no water, and users #2'sand #3's diversions approach zero as
IF approaches zero.
B. Economic Feasibility and Basic Operation of
Contingent Water Markets
Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson (HWH) began in the 1980s
to research contingent water marketing in Idaho as a means for increasing
the production of 'firm' power in the Snake River system.'5 'Firm'
power is the amount of power generated with stream flows at their
minimum historical levels. As the most secure supply, firm power
commands a higher price than 'non-firm' power generated with flows
above their minimum historical levels. The goal of a contingent water
market in this setting is to increase the availability of water for power
generation in low flow years by shifting water from irrigation to
hydropower use, thereby increasing firm power supplies in all years.
Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson stipulated that farmers
participating in the contingent water market would never be required to
relinquish more that 50 percent of normal consumptive use in any
year.' The maximum contractual amount of water would be required
only during extremely low flow conditions, with smaller amounts
required in other periods of below-average flow. Researchers HWH
calculated probabilities of market interruption of irrigation deliveries and
determined that boosting annual average flows from 7,178 cfs (the lowest

55. See J. Hamilton et al., Interruptible Water Markets In the Pacific Northwest, 71 Amer. J.
Agric. Econ. 63 (1989).
56. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing the assumptions underlying the
HWH study).
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flow on record) to an assured average flow of 8,042 cfs, would require
interruption in 19.6 percent of the years included in the historical record.
Only one year in 51 would require all contract water; two other years
would require 82 percent and 70.5 percent, respectively; and seven other
years would require lesser deliveries. 7 Researchers HWH assumed that
there would be at least 900,000 acres of farmland above Murphy gage on
the river that would have sufficiently secure water rights to participate
in the water market.' This acreage was estimated to be capable of
providing about 625,000 af of water to the market in a drought year
under the above-described conditions.-'
To determine the willingness of hydroelectric utilities and
irrigators to participate in a contingent water market, HWH estimated the
hydropower value of flow augmentation (representing the maximum
willingness to pay for market water) and the loss in net agricultural
income that a farmer could expect from leasing water through such a
market (representing the minimum payment needed to induce the farmer
to participate). Their results indicate that a contingent water market
would be economically feasible because hydropower benefits were
estimated to be about nine times greater than lost farm income.6
Hamilton and Whittlesey (HW) extended the HWH study by
investigating the economic feasibility of using marketed water directly to
augment flows for fish, with power production being a residual benefit
from increased flows.6' Researchers HW, retaining the stipulation that
participating farmers would never be required to give up more than 50
percent of their total consumed water in any year, estimated that flows
could be driven towards the 85,000 cfs water budget target by
interrupting agricultural deliveries about eight times in 51 years.62
Researchers HW assumed that, for purposes of fish passage, at least 1.8
million acres of land irrigated from surface diversions could participate
usefully in a contingent water market.ss This level of participation
would be unprecedented in water marketing. It would represent at least
one-third of the total irrigated acres in the Snake River basin.
To determine the willingness of utilities and irrigators to
participate in a contingent water market controlled by the needs of fish,
HW estimated the amount and value of power that could be produced

57. Hamilton et al., supra note 55, at 64.
58. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 10 (discussing the assumptions underlying
the HWH study).

59. Id.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Hamilton et al., supra note 55, at 73.
See Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17.
Id. at 8, 20.
Id. at 10.
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from market water obtained for fish. Maintaining the same assumptions
and lost farm income estimates underlying the HWH study, HW estimated that the value of power resulting from market flows shaped
specifically to meet the needs of fish would be about twice the estimated
farm income loss from market participation." Their results highlight the
self-sustainability of contingent water markets for augmenting fish flows.
Figure 2b, below, illustrates how stream flows might change from
those specified in Figure 2 if the initial flow, which equals 2,500 af over
an entire irrigation season, is assumed to be a critical dry-year flow
triggering contingent water marketing. The market requires #1, #2, and
#3 to relinquish half of their consumptive water use. The irrigation
efficiency of the three diverters is assumed for now to remain constant at
50 percent. The impact of the market under these circumstances is to
augment the water supply in the river by the 750 af (equals 250
multiplied by 3) of total consumptive use surrendered by #1, #2, and #3,
plus the total of 375 af (equals 125 multiplied by 3) that is no longer lost
to the aquifer, i.e., a combined total of 1,125 af.ss
Augmented flows come at some expense to the long-term stability
of the hydrological system, because deep percolation is reduced by 375
af. In an option market, where delivery is only occasional, the reduction
in recharge may be judged to be minor and acceptable. However, as the
frequency of expected interruption increases, or if the water rights are
permanently rather than optioned, the persistent reductions in recharge
could cause damage to third parties.
Figure 2c, below, shows the hypothetical operation of the market
when the critical flow triggering contingent water marketing decreases to
2,000 af over the entire irrigation season; irrigation efficiencies are
constant at 50 percent; and user #3 is junior to users #1 and #2. User #3

64. Id. at 28. Hydropower benefits are less when produced by market flows tailored to

fish needs, because the flows are not designed to firm up power supplies in all years.
65. The equation that maps the total reduction in consumptive use into the additional
water remaining in the stream for fish is where:
W = additional water left in stream for fish (at)
-CU = reduction in water consumptive use by crops (at)
A = Fraction of irrigation return flows going to aquifer (percent)
_ = irrigation efficiency prior to market-imposed shortage
For this example, the result is:
750(1 + .5(1/.5 - 1)) = 750(1.5) = 1,125 af
Hence, when efficiency is fixed at 50 percent and unused water is equally split between
deep percolation and return flow, each unit reduction in consumptive use leaves 1.5 af more
water in the stream over the entire irrigation season.
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is cut back to half of the entitlement (500 af) without the market, and thus
does not have a sufficiently secure right to allow participation in the
market. The scheme presumes the existence of legislation that prevents
#3 from using increased flows produced by the market to fill his or her
water right. User #3 continues to divert and use the same quantity of
water as without the market; hence, #3 is unaffected by the market. In
this case, reduction in consumptive use through users #1s and #2s
participation is 500 af, and flows are augmented to 750 af over the entire
irrigation season.'
To summarize, in the contingent water market controlled by the
needs of salmon, utilities purchase dry-year option contracts from farmers
representing, at most, 1.8 million irrigated acres in Idaho. Participating
farmers retain ownership of their water rights, but in dry years deliver
an amount no greater than 50 percent of their total consumptive use. The
augmented stream flows are shaped primarily for fish, but the flows also
generate the secondary power benefits that induce utilities to participate
in the contingent market. The next section considers the consistency of
such a market with the several legal conditions that must be satisfied for
governmental approval of water transfers.
II. CONSISTENCY OF CONTINGENT WATER MARKETING
WITH IDAHO'S PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
Idaho owns "[a]ll the waters of the state, when flowing in their
natural channels, including the waters of all natural springs and lakes
within the boundaries of the state."6' The state is authorized "to
supervise their [the waters'] appropriation and allotment to those
diverting the same therefrom for any beneficial purpose."' Appropriators do not acquire a property right in the water itself, but acquire a
usufructuary right to divert water from a public source of supply" for
the purpose of applying the water to a beneficial use.' The right is
initially "one of the appurtenances of, the land or other thing to which,
through necessity, said water is being applied... ," but the right can
be conveyed apart from the land.' Priority as between appropriators is

66. Using the mathematical formula, supra note 65: (500)(1.5) = 750 af.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Idaho Code § 42-101 (1990).
Id.
Id. § 42-103.
Id. § 42-104.
Id. § 42-101.
In re Robinson, 103 P.2d 693, 6% (1940).
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"the first in time is first in right."' Thus, junior users receive water only
when senior users have received theirs.74
A. Acquiring a Water Right
The sole means of acquiring a right to unappropriated water
currently is "by means of the [statutory] application, permit and license
procedure.... ."I7 The prospective appropriator files an application with
the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) detailing the water
source, nature of the proposed use, construction of delivery facilities, and
time required for completion of the delivery facilities.7' After receiving
the application, the IDWR informs the public regarding the details of the
proposed appropriation" and the date of a hearing, 8 and collects
written protests to the proposed appropriation." The public hearing is
an adversarial adjudicatory procedure in which the hearing officer
assumes a passive role s
The IDWR may deny or restrict a permit if it finds that: (1) the
proposed appropriation will reduce water under existing rights; (2) the
water supply is inadequate for the purpose stated; (3) the application is
made for speculative purposes; (4) the applicant does not have sufficient
financial resources to complete contemplated works; (5) the proposed
appropriation will conflict with the local public interest; or (6) the
proposed appropriation is contrary to conservation of water within
Idaho.' The applicant has the burden of proving that no other water
rights will be injured. At least one court decision has tempered this
burden by requiring that an injury must be substantial and not merely
"fanciful."' The applicant also must show that, "the project is either in
the local public interest or that there are factors overweighing the local
public interest...."'
The permit issued by the IDWR ripens into a licensed water right
if the permittee complies in a timely fashion with the conditions placed

73. Idaho Code §42-106.
74. R.T. Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 752 P.2d 625, 628 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
75. Idaho Code §42-201.

76. Id.§202.
77. Id. §42-203A(2).
78. Id. §42-203A(4).

79. Id.
80. Interview with G. Spackman, Hearings Officer, Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, in
Boise, Idaho (Apr. 21, 1992).
81. Idaho Code § 42-203A(5).
82. Beecher v. Cassia Creek Irrigation Co., 154 P.2d 507, 509 (Idaho 1944).
83. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985) (quoting the unpublished lower court
decision written by Judge G. Schroeder of the Fourth District Judicial District of Idaho (Dec.

22, 1980)).
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on water use under the permit." This is a vested water right,' the
priority of which relates back to the date of initial application.'
B. Water Transfers
Appropriators may convey their land and water rights separately
to new owners. The conveyance can act to "change the point of diversion,
period of use, or nature of use.. . ."I The transferor must file a new
application with the IDWR, specifying the desired modification.' The
IDWR then issues public notice, investigates the application, and
schedules another public hearing.' Idaho water statutes authorize the
IDWR to approve the change in whole, in part, or conditionally, provided
that:
no other water rights are injured thereby, the change does not
constitute an enlargement in use of the original right, and the
change is consistent with the conservation of water resources
within the state of Idaho and is in the local public interest...,
except the director [of the IDWR] shall not approve a change
in the nature of use from agricultural use where such change
would significantly affect the agricultural base of the local
8
area.9
The applicant again has the burden of proving that other water rights
will not be injured and that the transfer is in the local public interest.
These elements of proof and other potential obstacles to transfers of water
rights are considered below in detail.
THE 'LOCAL PUBLIC INTEREST' CONDITION
The Idaho legislature does not provide much guidance in
defining the 'local public interest' in the water code sections covering
initial appropriations and transfers. The reader is referred to another part
of the code defining such interest as, "the affairs of the people in the area
directly affected by the proposed use. ""

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Idaho Code §42-219.
Id.
Id.
Id. §42-108.
Id. §42-222(1).
Id.
Id.
Id. §42-203A(5)(e).
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The Supreme Court of Idaho recently considered the definition
of the 'local public interest' as a question of first impression in Shokal v.
Dunn.' The court found that the legislature intended the definition of
'local public interest' in the initial-appropriation and transfer sections of
the Idaho Code to be identical to the definition given in the minimum
stream flow section of the Code:
In I.C. §42-1501 [minimum stream flows], the legislature
declared it 'in the local public interest' that: 'the streams of
this state and their environments be protected against loss of
water supply to preserve the minimum stream flows required
for the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life,
recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation
values, and water quality.'93
The court also found that these elements, "are almost precisely
duplicated within the [counterpart] Alaska statute,"' and that the
Alaska statute contains other elements "which common sense argues
ought to be considered part of the local public interest.' 5 The Alaska
statute incorporated into Idaho case law* provides:
In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall
consider (1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the
proposed appropriation; (2) the effect of the economic activity
resulting from the proposed appropriation; (3) the effect on
fish and game resources and on public recreational
opportunities; (4) the effect on public health; (5) the effect of
loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within a
reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed
appropriation; (6) harm to other persons resulting from the
proposed appropriation; (7) the intent and ability of the
applicant to complete the appropriation; and (8) the effect
upon access to navigable or public water.'
The Shokal court admitted that, "the relevant elements and their relative
weights will vary with local needs, circumstances, and interests." The

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
Alaska Stat. § 46.15.080 (1992).
707 P.2d at 450.
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court left these factors to be dealt with under the "considerable flexibility
P "
and authority" of the Director of the IDWR.
Contingent water marketing geared to fish needs appears to fall
squarely within the Shokal court's definition of 'local public interest'. The
market augments migratory flows during critical dry-year periods. The
market is thus consistent with Idaho's public trust duty to preserve the
minimum stream flows required for the protection of fish habitat.
Moreover, "the effect of loss of alternative uses of water""® is minimal,
because agriculture retains ownership of the underlying water rights and
thus maintains the secure water supplies that promote continued
operation and long-term financing. In the relatively few dry-year periods
during which irrigation is interrupted, farmers retain at least 50 percent
of their normal consumptive use and they receive compensation for the
lost profits associated with the fraction of use temporarily relinquished.
Thus, rural communities are protected from the permanent, large-scale
transfers of water out of agriculture that many fear could lead to bank
and agribusiness failures and a reduced tax base to support schools and
other community services. 1 For these reasons, contingent water
marketing also is not expected to "significantly affect the agricultural base
of the local area""° in terms of either acreage or wealth.
Transfers of Federal Water by Local Irrigation Districts
Conditions on water transfers other than those required by state
law may be imposed if water is delivered by a local irrigation district
from a Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) reservoir. Under these circumstances, the federal government "proceed[s) in conformity with [state
water laws] " ' to appropriate and sell the reservoir water to irrigation
districts that own the water delivery works. The BOR often holds the
legal title to the stored water, while individual irrigators hold the
equitable title to water use.' In theory, the BOR may have little more
than a paper right, and thus may have little control over irrigators
desiring to transfer federal water."~ However, in practice, the BOR's
legal title may allow it to limit transfer rights. For example, the Secretary
of the Interior (hereinafter 'Interior') has expressed an intent to disallow
transfers that are anticipated to affect project operations significantly, or

99. Id. at 448.
100. Id. at 449.
101. Gould, supra note 48, at 19.
102. Idaho Code §42-222(1).
103. 43 U.S.C. §383 (1988).
104. See, e.g., B. Driver, The Effect of Reclamation Law on Voluntary Water Transfers,33 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 26-1, 26-8 (1987).
105. Id.
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are deemed to be controversial.'w Specific federal operational concerns
are: (1) project repayment obligations of irrigators receiving federally
subsidized water;" (2) federal statutes requiring that project water be
appurtenant to land and restricting the acreage that may receive a
complement of federal water;" and (3) project authorizations that
specify project boundaries and purposes."0 '
There are several reasons to expect that transfers of federal
project water via a contingent market could gain the approval of Interior.
First, Interior has expressed an intent to promote transfers of federal
water."n Second, project repayment and operation/maintenance
obligations of irrigators could be met by taxing a commensurate portion
of the irrigators' revenues from the sale of dry-year option contracts.
Third, even if a reclamation water project does not have the express
purpose of protecting salmon stocks, perhaps such a purpose could be
implied by the duties that federal agencies have toward protection of
listed species under Section 7 of the ESA.
Finally, federal water
transfers to nonagricultural uses such as fish passage would not
concentrate the federal water subsidy in the hands of fewer irrigators,
and thus the transfer would not require the restrictions otherwise placed
on owned and leased acreages in project areas."'
The IDWR must obtain the recommendation of the local district
watermaster before acting on a transfer application pertaining to water
delivered by an irrigation district."3 Most irrigation districts put severe
restrictions on water transfers to protect the financial stability of their
operations." 4 The Idaho State Department of Water Resources surveyed
irrigation water organizations in 1977 and 1978 and found that: (1) over
75 percent of the districts did not allow transfers from a member to a
nonmember; (2) only 47 percent allowed transfer of water on a temporary
basis; and (3) about 86 percent
did not allow temporary transfers from a
s
member to a non-member."

106. Federal Reclamation Law does not address the transfer of water from federal
projects. See NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 3-9 to 3-10.
107. Id. at 3-9.
108. Id. at 3-9.
109. Id. at 3-9.
110. Shupe et al., supra note 8, at 432.
111. See 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
112. The intent of federal reclamation policy consistently has been to distribute widely
the benefits of publicly financed reclamation projects. See, e.g., 35 Cong. Rec. 6758 (statement
of Rep. Martin).
113. Idaho Code §42-222(1).
114. See NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 3-7.
115. Id. at 3-4.
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There are reasons to expect that contingent water marketing
could gain the approval of local irrigation districts. The large quantity of
water put under contract by the market would make it much more
efficient to negotiate contracts with local irrigation districts rather than
with individual irrigators. Thus, districts could protect their financial
interests directly in contract negotiations rather than indirectly by
banning transfers. Also, the use of dry-year option contracts would leave
intact the long-term supply of water managed by districts.
Out-of-State Water Transfers
Finally, if a proposed water transfer involves "transport[ing]
[Idaho water] for use outside the state or chang[ing] the place or purpose
of use of a water right from a place in Idaho to a place outside the
state... ,,'i6 then the proponent must file an additional application for
the use of public waters outside the state.11 In making its decision on
the transfer application, the IDWR considers various factors such as
protecting against possible in-state water shortages, and the demand for
and supply of water in the destination state.
Contingent water market transfers might fall under this
additional 'out-of-state' scrutiny, since augmented dry-year flows within
Idaho would remain to flush smolts through the lower lengths of the
Snake River, which include areas outside of Idaho.""
Injuries to Other Water Rights
Water marketing analysts identify the third-party effects that
result from changing the composition of water rights by transferring a
right, as a major reason for the failure, except in limited situations, of
water markets to develop within the framework of the prior appropriation system."9 Debate in the water rights literature concerns
whether case-by-case public supervision could be avoided in large part
by redefining water entitlements to reflect return flow impacts more
Proponents of water marketing recommend that
accurately.'
entitlements be redefined in terms of consumptive use to 'internalize'

116. Idaho Code §42-401(2).

117. Id.
118. See, e.g., letter from K. Higginson, Director of the Idaho Dep't of Water Resources,
to entities on the Dep't of Water Resources' general distribution list (Sept. 5, 1991)(on file
with authors)(opining that augmenting Snake River flows within Idaho to promote the
continued downstream migration of endangered salmon species into other states is an
out-of-state use).
119. See Gould, supra note 48, at 4.
120. See, e.g., J. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making:A Critique,2 J. L. & Econ.
41, 46, 58 (1959); NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 3-3.
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(i.e., account for) the external effects of water trading.12 This effectively
would limit market participants to trading consumptive entitlements.
Successful internalization of third-party impacts, the proponents argue,
would largely obviate the need for case-by-case approval supervision.1n
However, recent research on water transfers demonstrates that
quantifying water rights in the amount of consumptive use does not fully
solve the problem of third-party effects in some cases." Third-party
appropriators may be vulnerable to harm when: (1) trades of
consumptive rights are so large relative to stream flows that the trades
create binding flow constraints," and (2) there is no obligation to
deliver large flows to a senior rights holder downstream."z Moreover,
simple redefinition cannot be expected to solve numerous other possible
transfer-related problems regarding such things as water quality, timing
of return flows, conveyance losses, and degradation of the aquatic
environment. 26 Finally, the technical and economic difficulties of
calculating consumptive use lead states-including Idaho-to use
representative values that probably do not fully mitigate the impairment
of individual third-parties. In summary, consumptive water rights, even
if perfectly calculated, would not appear to eliminate the need for
case-by-case supervision of trades to identify external impacts and to
impose requisite mitigation measures.
While contingent market transfers in Idaho would be based on a
representative value for consumptive water use,' the persistence of
some third-party effects would maintain the need for supervision via a
transfer approval procedure. Idaho's current procedure is designed to
supervise permanent, one-time water transfers. This procedure guards
against perpetual third-party impairment and removal of resources from
rural communities, and thus sacrifices some allocative flexibility for
increased security of these other water interests. Nevertheless, it
conceivably could operate to supervise intermittent water transfers. For

121. See Gould, supra note 48, at 5.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 48, at 4. See also B. Colby, TransactionsCosts and Efficiency
in Western Water Allocation, 72 Amer. J.Agric. Econ. 1184 (1990); R. Young, Why Are There
So Few TransactionsAmong Water Users?, 68 Amer. J. Agric. Econ. 1143 (1986).
124. A binding flow constraint occurs when a water user does not have sufficient water
at the point of diversion to make the full allotted diversion, even though total consumption
along the stream is no greater than total supply. See T. Anderson & R. Johnson, The Problem
of Instream Flows, 24 Econ. Inq. 535, 541 (1986).
125. Gould, supra note 48, at 17.
126. Id. at 13-18.
127. Idaho employs a representative value associated with the water needs of alfalfa.
Alfalfa is a relatively high water intensive crop, which may overstate consumptive use in
individual cases. See NMFS Report, supra note 31, at 5-3.
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example, the IDWR could investigate the possibility of third-party
impairment at a public hearing when an option contract is initially
established, impose contract conditions that protect third-parties each
time the option is exercised, and then allow the contract to run its course.
However, the unusually large amount of water12 that may be
transferred by the contingent market might make it worthwhile to
streamline the approval process. Many states already have enacted
expedited approval processes for temporary transfers supplying transient
water needs before a resumption of the permanent use."2 Expedited
approval processes reduce the normal duty of state water agencies to
consider third-party impairment, because the temporary nature of the
transfer makes injuries short-lived. Intermittent transfers have much in
common with temporary transfers in that ownership of the water right
does not change hands. The buyer is given temporary use of the water
when the option is exercised and the seller retains use at all other times;
and third-party impairment is temporary. Intermittent transfers are
different from temporary transfers in that the temporary impairment is
recurrent in intermittent transfers. However, this recurrence of third-party
impairment, identified in an expedited review, could be resolved in the
option contracts.
The IDWR is not authorized expressly by statute to provide expedited approval procedures for temporary or intermittent transfers of flow
rights supplying one-time or recurrent, temporary needs before a
resumption of the permanent use. However, the IDWR relies on its own
discretion to grant permission for temporary, one-time transfers without
a public hearing when the quantity of transferred water is small and
there is some sense of urgency. The IDWR has applied this abbreviated,
ad hoc transfer procedure mainly to meet the needs of construction
projects.'" A better solution, given the large amount of water to be
covered by option contracts, is for the legislature to formalize an
expedited transfer-approval procedure for temporary and intermittent
transfers of flow rights.
The Idaho legislature has done this for water stored in the Idaho
Water Bank (hereinafter 'Water Bank'). Water Bank statutes recently
were amended to provide an interim policy 13 expediting the approval
procedure regulating the rental of water stored in the Water Bank for

128. Hamilton & Whittlesey, supra note 17, at 10.
129. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§1725-1730 (West Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-92-302
(West 1990); Nev. Rev. Stat. §533.345 (Supp. 1991); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§72-6-1 to 72-6-7 (1985
Repl. Pamp.); Wash. Rev. Code §90.03.390 (Supp. 1991); W yo. Stat. §41-3-110 (1977 & Supp.
1987); Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 (Supp. 1992).
130. Spackman, supra note 80.
131. See Act of March 30, 1992, supra note 42.
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salmon migration, provided that the rental flows are used for power
production within Idaho." The interim policy relieves the IDWR of its
usual duty to:
determine under section 42-1763, Idaho Code, where the water
supply is sufficient for the purpose for which it is sought,
whether the rental would cause the use of water to be
enlarged beyond that authorized under the water right to be
rented, whether such use is in the public interest, or whether
such use is consistent with factors [governing the approval of
rental water for out-of-state use].m
The interim policy does not cover the transfer of flow rights for salmon
migration, but it does provide an example of both the form an expedited
flow-rights transfer procedure may take, and the Idaho Legislature's
potential willingness to craft an expedited procedure for salmon
migration.
An investigation of water transfer statutes in the western United
States shows that only the Montana Code currently includes express
provisions for water transfers for intermittent use."3 These provisions
neither appear as a distinct statute in the Montana Code, nor are intended
to cover contingent water marketing. Rather, the intermittent transfer
provisions are authorized as a subcase of temporary transfers: "[a]
temporary change in appropriation right may be approved for a period
not to exceed 10 years. A temporary change in appropriation right may
be approved for consecutive or intermittent use."'
During the original 10 year term of the temporary transfer, "the
[water rights] department may modify or revoke its authorization for a
temporary change if it determines that the right of an appropriator... is
adversely affected."" The Water Rights Department may renew the
temporary transfer for another ten-year period:
Renewal of an authorization for a temporary change in
appropriation right requires application to the department by
the appropriator. Upon application, the department shall
notify other appropriators potentially affected by the renewal
and shall allow 30 days for submission of new evidence of
adverse effects to other water rights. A temporary change
authorization may not be renewed by the department if it

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
See Mont. Code Ann. §&5-2-407 (2) (1991).
Id.
Id. §85-2407(4).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol 33

determines that the right of an appropriator other than [the
applicant] is adversely affected.'
When the temporary transfer is completed, water deliveries automatically
revert back to the permanent owner of the water right with the same
priority as before the transfer.M
Temporary and intermittent transfers appear to gain initial
approval with relative ease, but the possibilities of midcourse revocation
and nonrenewal tend to strip the transfers of their certainty. The Montana
statute's shift in emphasis from flexibility early in the process to more
third-party security later in the process is opposite of the emphasis
recommended in the preceding paragraphs of this section. There, it was
suggested that the water rights department make an expedited
investigation of third-party impairment and recommend modifications
initially, and then allow the temporary transfers to occur intermittently
without reconsideration. This would protect third-parties to the
transaction without depriving the intermittent transfers of their
midcourse security.
The New Mexico 'water-use leasing' section of the state water
statutes presents another possible framework.'" The section does not
expressly authorize or prohibit intermittent transfers, but it does offer an
expedited review process for leases containing initial and renewal terms
not exceeding ten years."O The lease cannot injure other water users,
but the applicant's burden of proof is limited to responding to specific
injury claims at a public hearing."' If no objections are filed against the
application, the state engineer may approve the lease without a
hearing.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the legal feasibility of superimposing a
contingent water market on the Idaho prior appropriation water rights
system as one means of providing sufficient water for fish passage during
drought years. Under the proposed market system, utilities would
purchase dry-year option contracts from farmers representing about 1.8
million irrigated acres in Idaho. Participating farmers would retain
ownership of their water rights, but in dry years would deliver an
amount no greater than 50 percent of their total consumptive use. Utilities

137.
138.
139.
140.
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142.

Id. 5-2-407(3).
Id. §8-2407(S) and (6).
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Id. §72-6.6.
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would have the incentive to participate because, although augmented
stream flows would be shaped primarily for fish, the flows also would
generate secondary power benefits.
The paper concludes that a contingent water market would be
legally feasible for the following reasons. First, the market's operation
would be consistent with Idaho's 'local public interest' restriction on
water transfers, which restriction monitors the impact of transfers on fish
habitat and on the socioeconomic stability of rural communities. The
market would convert irrigation water to fish production in critical
dry-year periods, never taking more than 50 percent of normal consumptive use and always compensating irrigators for the lost profits associated
with the fraction of water temporarily relinquished. The market also
would leave permanent ownership of water rights in agriculture. Since
agriculture would retain a secure long-term water supply, the market also
would not be expected to affect the agricultural base of the local area
significantly in terms of either acreage or wealth.
Second, restrictions placed on the transfer of federal water
delivered by local irrigation districts would be surmountable. Interior has
expressed an intent to promote water transfers in federal projects, and the
recovery of a listed species under the ESA provides a strong purpose.
Moreover, project repayment and operation and maintenance obligations
of irrigators could be met by taxing a commensurate portion of their
revenues from the sale of contingent water contracts. Local irrigation
districts would be direct participants in the markets, and thus could
protect their financial interests directly in contract negotiations rather
than indirectly by banning transfers proposed by individual members.
Finally, although Idaho's transfer-approval procedure is designed
to supervise permanent, one-time water transfers, it could conceivably
operate to supervise intermittent water transfers coordinated by
contingent water markets. For example, the procedure could be used to:
(1) investigate the possibility of third-party impairment at a public
hearing when an option contract is initially established, and (2) impose
contract conditions that protect third-parties each time the option is
exercised. The contract then could be allowed to run its course. However,
the unprecedented large amount of water that would be transferred by
the contingent market might make it worthwhile to streamline the
approval process for flow-rights transfers by enacting an expedited
approval process for intermittent transfers. Water officials would be
relieved somewhat of their usual duty to consider third-party impairment, because the temporary nature of the transfer would make injuries
short-lived. Recurrence of temporary impairments identified in an
expedited review could be dealt with in contingent water contracts.
This paper does not argue that flow augmentation via contingent
water marketing should be adopted as the favored, or suffice as the sole,
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salmon-recovery action. Remedial action, mandated by the ESA, may well
include some combination of reservoir drawdowns and flow augmentation. The present legal and institutional investigation of contingent water
markets will be useful in this eventuality. For any potential recovery
action, it is desirable to know as much as possible about the action's
economic, legal, and biological consequences.

